Public Debt as Private Liquidity by Woodford, Michael
American Economic Association
Public Debt as Private Liquidity
Author(s): Michael Woodford
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the
Hundred and Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1990), pp.
382-388
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006605 .
Accessed: 21/11/2013 15:46
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Economic Review.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Thu, 21 Nov 2013 15:46:16 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Public Debt as Private Liquidity 
By MICHAEL WOODFORD* 
There has been a great deal of public 
concern in the United States about the rapid 
growth of the public debt during the 1980s. 
Among economists, the grounds for concern 
most often stressed are that a higher public 
debt should reduce national savings (and, as 
a result, capital accumulation), with conse- 
quences for future income that are expected 
to lower welfare, at least in the long run. 
These consequences are predicted by what is 
often referred to (B. Douglas Bernheim, 
1989) as the "neoclassical" model, a general 
equilibrium version of the "life cycle" model 
of consumption and savings developed by 
Modigliani and associates. Of course, ac- 
cording to the "Ricardian" view (Robert 
Barro, 1989), changes in the level of public 
debt should have no effect at all (except 
insofar as the higher future taxes implied by 
a higher public debt distort incentives), so 
that the concern is largely misplaced. But 
many economists are skeptical about the 
practical relevance of the Ricardian view, 
because of the apparent connection between 
government deficits and a variety of aspects 
of economic activity and financial market 
conditions (see, for example, Bernheim, and 
Robert Eisner, 1989). For example, the high 
real interest rates of the 1980s are often 
attributed to the rapid growth of the U.S. 
public debt in this period. As a result, the 
other predictions of the neoclassical model 
are widely accepted as well. 
I wish to argue that the analysis provided 
by the neoclassical model may not be an 
adequate guide to policy, even if certain of 
its predictions are correct. Instead, I direct 
attention to an alternative explanation of the 
effects of changes in the level of public debt, 
which leads to very different conclusions 
about the welfare consequences of such poli- 
cies. According to this view, " Ricardian 
equivalence" fails because of imperfect fi- 
nancial intermediation. Some economic units 
are liquidity constrained, which is to say that 
they are unable to borrow against their fu- 
ture income at a rate of interest as low as 
that at which the government borrows. In- 
creased government borrowing can benefit 
such parties, insofar as they effectively re- 
ceive a highly liquid asset, government debt, 
in exchange for giving the government an 
increased claim on their future income, their 
own claim to which represented a highly 
illiquid asset. A higher public debt, insofar 
as it implies a higher proportion of liquid 
assets in private sector wealth, increases the 
flexibility of the private sector in responding 
to variations in both income and spending 
opportunities, and so can increase economic 
efficiency. 
There are several reasons to prefer the 
liquidity-constrained model to the neoclassi- 
cal model as an explanation of the nonneu- 
trality of government deficits. One is that the 
liquidity constraint hypothesis can explain 
the persistently low real returns on U.S. pub- 
lic debt relative to other kinds of assets.' 
Another is that the liquidity-constrained 
model is not vulnerable to the Barro critique, 
according to which altruistic bequests be- 
tween generations should completely elimi- 
nate the nonneutralities associated with the 
neoclassical model. A third is the theoretical 
parsimony of an explanation of the long- 
and short-run effects of government deficits 
along essentially the same lines. In the pure 
neoclassical model, with efficient financial 
intermediation, government deficits, even 
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IModels with a similar structure to the one described 
here are used to explain both the low real return on 
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when expected to result in a permanently 
higher level of government debt, should have 
negligible effects upon spending decisions in 
the short run (James Poterba and Lawrence 
Summers, 1987), even though the long-run 
effects may be significant due to the eventual 
effect on the capital stock. As a result, li- 
quidity constraints are often invoked to ex- 
plain apparent short-run nonneutralities. It 
is not clear, then, why one should not also 
emphasize the consequences of liquidity con- 
straints for the long-run effects (that are the 
main focus of current policy discussions) as 
well. 
Finally, the liquidity-constrained model 
predicts that variations in the public debt 
should be important as such, both in the 
short and in the long run. As Laurence Kot- 
likoff (1988) has observed, in the neoclassical 
model, government deficits are nonneutral 
only insofar as they are equivalent to a 
transfer of wealth between generations. Ac- 
cordingly, it is not the public debt as such 
that matters in that model, but rather the 
degree to which such intergenerational redis- 
tribution occurs-an appropriate measure of 
which would have to take into account other 
aspects of fiscal policy as well. Indeed, Kot- 
likoff argues that once these other aspects of 
fiscal policy, such as changes in Social Secu- 
rity provisions, are taken into account, the 
1970s would have to be judged a period of 
relatively "loose" fiscal policy, and the 1980s 
a period of relatively "tight" fiscal policy. 
This means that the neoclassical model can- 
not be used to explain any of the supposed 
effects of high deficits in the 1980s, while the 
liquidity-constrained model presented here 
can. 
I. Public Debt in 
a Liquidity-Constrained Economy 
Consider an economy made up of two 
types of infinite lived households, with the 
number of each normalized as one. Type A 
households have endowment el(l + g)t in all 
even periods and e2(1 + g)t in all odd peri- 
ods, while type B households have endow- 
ment e2(1 + g)t in even periods and el(l + 
g)t in odd periods, where el > e2 ?0. Both 
types (i = A, B) seek to maximize an infinite 
horizon objective function 
00 
E t(l + g), t(C'VO( + g) ) 
t=O 
where v is an increasing, strictly concave 
function, and where C/' denotes consump- 
tion in period t by each household of type i. 
(We may suppose that each household is an 
infinite lived family whose members increase 
at the rate g, with per capita endowment 
remaining constant; the family pursues a 
joint consumption and savings program to 
maximize a discounted sum of individual 
family members' utilities.) Total lump sum 
tax collections in period t will be assumed to 
be equally divided across the two types, in 
the amount T1/2 per household. For simplic- 
ity, there is no government consumption. 
Finally, each consumer has the opportunity 
each period to save by holding government 
bonds earning a real rate of interest r, or by 
accumulating capital, but is unable to bor- 
row against his future endowments. The real 
value of the outstanding government debt at 
the end of period t will be denoted Dt. The 
goods produced in period t using capital are 
= (1 + g)tf(Kt/(1 + g)tl), where Kt is 
the period t capital stock, and f is an in- 
creasing, strictly concave function. This can 
be interpreted as a constant returns to scale 
production technology with a fixed factor 
that grows at the same rate g as other en- 
dowments. It will be assumed for simplicity 
that households are all equally endowed with 
the fixed factor. 
Let us consider a stationary equilibrium in 
which at the end of each period, the house- 
holds that had a high endowment in that 
period (type A in even periods, type B in 
odd periods) save by holding both govern- 
ment debt and capital, but the consumers 
who had a low endowment are liquidity con- 
strained (i.e., would borrow if they could at 
the rate of interest received by savers). By a 
stationary equilibrium, I mean one in which 
Cti7(1 + g)t equals c in every period t in 
which type i households have a high per 
capita endowment, and c in every period in 
which they have a low per capita endow- 
ment, in which Kt/(1 + g)t = k, Dt/(I + g)t 
= d and Tt /(1 +g)t = Tare likewise con- 
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stants, and in which the real interest rate on 
government debt is a constant r. In such an 
equilibrium, c, c, k, d, T, and r satisfy 
(1) v'( c)/v'(c) =/ (1 + r) 
(2) v'( c)/v'( c) (1 + r) 
(3) f'(k)=l+r 
(4) c=el+[f(k)-(1+r)k]/2 
- T/2 - d - (1 + g) k 
(5) c= e2 +[f (k)-(1 + r)k]/2-T/2 
+d(1+r/l+g) +(1+r)k 
(6) c+c=el+e2+f(k)-(1+g)k 
Here the expression [ f(k)-(1 + r)k] repre- 
sents the competitive returns to the fixed 
factor of production. We wish to compare 
alternative stationary equilibria correspond- 
ing to different permanent levels d of out- 
standing debt per capita. This requires us to 
solve (1) and (3)-(6) for c, c, k, r, and T, 
given d, checking that the solution is also 
consistent with (2). Since (1) implies (2) if 
1 + r < f -1, and is inconsistent with (2) oth- 
erwise, we can replace (2) by the requirement 
that the equilibrium real interest rate be 
below that upper bound. 
These equilibrium conditions are identical 
to those of a neoclassical model of the kind 
considered by Peter Diamond (1965), with 
an appropriate identification of variables. 
Let us define cl = c, c2 = (1 + g)c, e1= el, 
'2 = (1 + g)e2, and u(c1, c2) = v(5l) + 
,3(1 + g)v(4F/1 + g). Then equations (1) and 
(3)-(6) correspond to the conditions for a 
stationary equilibrium of an overlapping 
generations model in which each consumer 
lives for two consecutive periods, has endow- 
ment eL in the first period of life and e2 in 
the second, has access to the same produc- 
tion technology as above, has an endowment 
of the fixed factor of production that is 
(1 + g) times as large in the second period 
of life as in the first, and chooses a life 
cycle consumption plan (cl, -2) to maximize 
u(J1, c2), and in which lump sum taxes in the 
second period are 1 + g times as large as in 
the first. 
As a result, the liquidity-constrained model 
predicts exactly the same effects of changes 
in the size of the government debt on real 
interest rates as does the neoclassical model, 
although the former model is perfectly con- 
sistent with the Barro view that finite lived 
consumers belong to infinite lived families 
linked by bequests that, as a result, act as 
though they were jointly maximizing a single 
infinite horizon objective function. In partic- 
ular, if consumption is sufficiently substi- 
tutable over time, a higher stationary debt 
per capita d will be associated with a higher 
real interest rate r, and hence (because of 
(3)) with a lower stationary capital stock per 
capita. Nonetheless, the two models make 
different predictions about other kinds of 
policy experiments. In particular, the liquid- 
ity-constrained model predicts no necessary 
effect upon interest rates, saving, or capital 
accumulation of a change in the size of So- 
cial Security transfers, assuming that age is 
uncorrelated with whether a consumer is 
currently a saver or a dissaver, while the 
neoclassical model predicts that variations in 
the size of Social Security transfers have 
effects that are formally equivalent to those 
of a variation in the size of the public debt.2 
Furthermore, the welfare consequences of 
variations in the size of the public debt are 
not the same in the two models. In the 
neoclassical model with perfect financial in- 
termediation and lump sum taxes, equilib- 
rium is Pareto optimal as long as r > g (the 
2In the neoclassical model, the relation that exists 
between d and variables such as r and k depends upon 
the distribution of net tax collections between young 
and old, which is why Kotlikoff argues that the deficit 
as such is irrelevant. In the liquidity-constrained model, 
the relation that exists between d and r and k similarly 
depends upon the distribution of net tax collections 
between liquidity-constrained and unconstrained house- 
holds, but, in this case, there is much greater reason to 
set aside the possibility of changes in that ratio when 
considering optimal fiscal policy (the liquidity, con- 
straints themselves may exist because of difficulty in 
observing differences in individual households' circum- 
stances), and, in any event, the additional dimension of 
fiscal policy represented by that ratio has nothing to do 
with Social Security provisions. 
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case generally considered to be of empirical 
relevance, as discussed in Section III). And, 
comparing stationary equilibria satisfying 
this condition, all are Pareto optimal, but the 
stationary level of utility u(J1,J2) is lower 
the higher is r, which is to say, the higher is 
d. The stationary level of utility is maxi- 
mized by having a level of government debt 
only high enough to result in a rate of return 
r = g (the Golden Rule case). But, in the 
model presented here, an efficient allocation 
of resources requires that v'(c)/v'(c) = 
v'(c)/v'(c) (i.e., that the liquidity constraints 
do not bind), which occurs only in an equi- 
librium with 1 + r = f3-1. Thus efficiency re- 
quires that the real rate of interest be kept 
high enough, which, in the case of large 
enough intertemporal elasticity of substitu- 
tion, requires that the outstanding public debt 
per capita be maintained at a high enough 
level. The level of real interest rates required 
for this condition to hold is higher than in 
the case of the neoclassical efficiency crite- 
rion, since (in order for the objective func- 
tions of the infinite lived households to be 
well defined) we must assume that f -' > 1 + 
g. Furthermore, in the liquidity-constrained 
model, equilibrium is still inefficient (and a 
higher public debt is needed to achieve effi- 
ciency) if it is still possible for an increased 
public debt to affect interest rates, saving, or 
investment, since only when the liquidity 
constraints bind does Ricardian equivalence 
fail. 
This result is not really a novel one. For 
the model is exactly the one in which Tru- 
man Bewley (1980) explains Friedman's doc- 
trine regarding the "optimum quantity of 
money." Bewley postulates that money is 
held because it supplies liquidity in exactly 
the sense discussed here-it allows con- 
sumers to smooth consumption in the face of 
endowment fluctuations and an assumed in- 
ability to borrow against future endowment 
income. He compares alternative stationary 
equilibria with different constant rates of 
money growth and inflation, and argues that 
a policy that results in a higher level of real 
money balances and a higher real return to 
holding money improves efficiency. Specifi- 
cally, he shows that a Pareto optimal alloca- 
tion of resources occurs only when the real 
return on money is made as high as house- 
holds' rate of time preference. This is just 
my result regarding the return on govern- 
ment debt. Note that my model has said 
nothing about nominal values; the above 
conclusions are independent of the rates of 
inflation and hence of nominal interest rates 
in the alternative stationary equilibria, and, 
in particular, continue to hold in the case of 
government debt bearing a zero nominal in- 
terest rate. 
According to a common view, the Bewley- 
Friedman argument is relevant for money, 
but not for other government paper. How- 
ever, Treasury securities (especially those 
with short maturities) also seem to enjoy a 
liquidity premium. This is shown by the fact 
that the yield on Treasury bills is lower than 
that on other assets, such as equities, to an 
extent that cannot plausibly be accounted 
for simply as a consequence of the assets' 
different degree of riskiness. But the exis- 
tence of a liquidity premium implies perfect 
financial intermediation, and a fiscal policy 
that lowers this premium by bringing the 
rate of return on Treasury bills into line with 
those on other securities should increase ef- 
ficiency.3 
One disadvantage of the above model as 
an illustration of this view is that govern- 
ment debt and capital must earn the same 
rate of return, so that the liquidity services 
provided by government debt do not show 
up as a liquidity premium on government 
debt relative to other assets, and the increase 
in efficiency associated with a higher-debt 
policy is not reflected in the reduction of 
such a premium. However, as the following 
example shows, such effects can easily occur 
in a liquidity-constrained economy. 
II. Public Debt May "Crowd In" Investment 
I have presented an example above in 
which the effects of government debt on 
national saving and investment are exactly 
3This conclusion is subject, of course, to the same 
sorts of second-best considerations that have been 
pointed out as qualifications to the Friedman argument. 
(See my forthcoming paper for a survey.) 
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the same as in the neoclassical model, to 
show that even if those predictions of the 
neoclassical model were found to be correct, 
the welfare conclusions of the model could 
be wrong. But, in fact, a higher public debt 
does not imply a lower capital stock under 
such general conditions in the case of 
economies with imperfect financial interme- 
diation as in the neoclassical model. This is 
another significant difference between the 
two models. It is important to realize that 
acceptance of the view that the high real 
interest rates of the 1980s are largely a con- 
sequence of the change in U.S. fiscal policy 
does not require one to also believe that the 
higher government deficits have crowded out 
investment.4 The following variant of the 
previous model shows how a higher public 
debt can actually bring about higher levels 
of national saving and investment, by reduc- 
ing the extent to which people with access to 
productive investment opportunities are li- 
quidity constrained. 
Instead of assuming that consumers have 
access to the production technology in every 
period, let us suppose that a given household 
has access to it only in certain periods. The 
idea (represented here in an extreme form) is 
that particularly attractive investment op- 
portunities come along for a given economic 
unit only at certain times, so that it has more 
use for funds on those occasions than at 
other times. An important function of liquid 
assets, in an economy without frictionless 
loan markets, is to allow such entities to 
concentrate their spending more in the peri- 
ods when they have especially good opportu- 
nities. In order to focus upon this function, 
we can ignore altogether the need to smooth 
endowment fluctuations, by assuming a con- 
stant endowment stream. 
Let us again suppose that there are two 
types of infinite lived households, with the 
same preferences and endowments as before, 
except that now el= e2 - e. The two types 
now differ instead in the times at which they 
have access to the production technology. 
Type A households can invest in physical 
capital in odd periods, and use that capital 
to produce in the following even periods; 
type B households have the opportunity to 
invest in even periods and to produce in the 
following odd periods. The production tech- 
nology is the same as in the previous section. 
Again, the endowment of the fixed factor is 
equally divided across the two household 
types. Finally, let us assume again that pri- 
vate borrowing is impossible, but that all 
households are able to save by holding gov- 
ernment debt. Taxes are again lump sum 
and equally distributed across household 
types. 
Let us consider a stationary equilibrium in 
which all consumers are liquidity con- 
strained in the periods in which they have 
investment opportunities (and as a result, 
hold no government debt in those periods), 
but not in the other periods (in which they 
save by holding government debt). Again, let 
c denote consumption per family member 
when the household is not liquidity con- 
strained, and c consumption per family 
member when it is. Let d denote government 
debt held at the end of the period, and k 
denote the capital stock brought into the 
period, per non-liquidity-constrained family 
member, and let Tr/2 denote the taxes col- 
lected per family member each period. The;i 
in such a stationary equilibrium, c, c, di k, 
T, and r must satisfy 
(7) v'( c)/v'( c) =,(1 Jr r) 
(8) v ()v( -)=/f'(k) 
(9) f '(k) >1 + J r 
(10) c=el+[f(k)-(1+r)k]/2-d 
+(1+r)k-Tr/2 
(11) c = e2 +[f(k)-(1+r)kj/2 
+ d(1+r/1+g)-(1+g)k-T/2 
(12) cJ+c=2e+f(k)-(1+g)k 
4The other major industrial countries, that have on 
the whole pursued tighter fiscal policies, have suffered 
even greater declines in rates of private saving and 
domestic rates of investment (Barry Bosworth, 1990). 
He suggests that the reduced rates of saving and invest- 
ment have resulted mainly from the slowdown in in- 
come and productivity growth since the mid-1970s. 
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Let us consider how the solution for c, c, k, 
T, and r varies as the value of d is varied. 
The most important difference between 
this model and that of the previous section is 
that (7) and (8) imply 
(13) f'(k) = 1-2(1 + r)1 
so that the steady-state capital stock varies 
directly, rather than inversely, with the real 
return on government debt, which here is 
not equal to the return on capital. In fact, 
the spread between the return on capital and 
that on government debt is given by f '(k) - 
(1 + r), which by (13) is a decreasing func- 
tion of r. As before, if consumption is suf- 
ficiently substitutable between periods, sta- 
tionary equilibria with higher values of d (in 
the range where the liquidity constraints 
bind) will be associated with higher levels of 
the real interest rate r. But, now this implies 
a higher stationary capital stock per capita. 
A higher government debt can actually in- 
crease the steady-state capital stock, by im- 
proving the efficiency with which investment 
can be financed as a result of easing house- 
holds' problem of the illiquidity of their 
claims to future endowment income.5 Fur- 
thermore, in the case described, the spread 
between the return on capital and on gov- 
ernment debt will be a decreasing function 
of the level of debt. Thus the increase in 
private sector liquidity due to an increase in 
public debt shows up in this case as a reduc- 
tion of the spread between these two rates of 
return. 
As in the previous section, in this econ- 
omy Pareto optimality requires that v'(c)/ 
v'(c) = v'(c)/v'(c), which again requires that 
1+ r = /-3 . Again, keeping the real return 
on government debt high enough (in this 
case, high enough to eliminate the spread 
between the returns on the two assets) re- 
quires that the public debt be maintained at 
a high enough level. 
III. Higher Public Debt Need Not Imply 
Higher Taxes 
An obvious qualification to the results of 
the previous two sections concerns the as- 
sumption of lump sum taxation. Equations 
(4)-(6), or equivalently (10)-(12), imply the 
relation T = (r - g/l + g)d. If r > g, this 
implies that a higher-debt stationary equilib- 
rium must also have a higher level of tax 
collections. If, as assumed thus far, these 
taxes are lump sum, the size of tax collec- 
tions has no effect upon welfare compar- 
isons. But, it is more realistic to assume that 
the taxes must be raised in ways that will 
distort the allocation of resources. This would 
be a source of lower welfare in high-debt 
stationary equilibria, and would have to be 
weighed against the liquidity effects dis- 
cussed above. 
While this argument could well mean that 
it is not optimal to increase the size of the 
public debt to the point of "satiation in 
liquidity" (i.e., the point where liquidity con- 
straints cease to bind), it remains likely, even 
when r > g, that some positive permanent 
level of public debt per capita will be opti- 
mal. This is in contrast to it being desirable 
to reduce the debt as much as possible. But, 
it is also important to realize that the extent 
to which a permanent increase in the ratio of 
public debt to national income requires an 
increase in future taxes need not be very 
great. Indeed, there may not have to be any 
increase in taxes at all. 
Higher d implies higher T only if r> g. 
Andrew Abel et al. (1989) argue that this is 
the empirically relevant case, in the context 
of a standard neoclassical model with effi- 
cient financial intermediation. In a station- 
ary equilibrium with r <g, gross profits 
k,f'(k,) should in each period be less than 
gross investment (1 + g)k,+1; but, in the U.S 
economy, gross profits are always about 
25-28 percent of GNP while gross invest- 
ment is only about 14-18 percent of GNP. 
But this evidence actually only shows that 
f'(k) >1+ g. In an economy with efficient 
financial intermediation, this would imply 
that r > g, but in a liquidity-constrained 
economy like that discussed in the previous 
sectionr, it does not. Dynamic efficiency of 
5Hence Eisner's result suggesting that increases in 
the public debt tend to be associated with increases, 
rather than decreases, in investment is consistent with a 
fully "classical" theory of aggregate supply determina- 
tion. 
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the intertemporal production plan, estab- 
lished by Abel et al., does not rule out the 
possibility that an increase in the public debt 
can be simply rolled over forever without 
taxes ever having to be increased. Indeed, 
this appears to be a realistic possibility in 
the case of the U.S. economy. For the aver- 
age real return on Treasury bills over the 
postwar period has been close to zero, while 
the average growth rate of real GNP has 
been over 3 percent per year. If this is so, the 
liquidity effects described in the previous 
two sections suggest that welfare could be 
increased by a permanent increase in the 
level of the public debt. 
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